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Introduction 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a work often understood to focus 
on individualistic philosophy and offer only ancillary insight into politics. The focus of 
this work is Zarathustra’s mission of spreading the gospel of value creation to inspire the 
rise of the overman in order to overcome nihilism. While there are many different ways 
to interpret Zarathustra’s seemingly external values (or lack thereof), none perfectly 
solves the incoherence of Zarathustra’s teachings by itself; one must synthesize multiple 
interpretations to understand his message completely. By the end of Zarathustra, it is 
apparent Zarathustra has shunned politics but also failed in his quest to convert worthy 
and able men to the philosophy of value creation. To understand what Nietzsche, not 
Zarathustra, prescribes for society and the individual in Zarathustra, one must understand 
the relationship between Zarathustra’s teachings on value theory and politics. The value 
theory allows one to understand Nietzsche’s problems with modern society and how it 
values men, specifically the rise of the liberal state and the docile, domestic existence it 
fosters for a species that once fought for great things. The politics create the environment 
in which nihilism and the last man can be avoided and the overman can triumph. Far 
from being secondary, one must understand Nietzsche’s political philosophy if he is 
concerned with bringing about a world governed by value creation and capable of 
creating overmen. Zarathustra’s value theory may not be coherent, but it provides a 
description of the psychology of the overman, willing to fight for his values in 
Nietzsche’s ideal political system, aristocracy. Thus Spoke Zarathustra does not just 
detail Zarathustra’s journey and the internal struggle of the value-creating overman; it 
also focuses on the politics that are necessary to allow the overman to struggle and 
6 
overcome. Nietzsche’s goal, then, is not to explain a coherent philosophy, but to describe 
a possible world of individual struggle, value creation, and aristocratic politics that can 
deliver mankind from the beastly malaise of modern society, the eternal recurrence, and 
nihilism. 
My paper will argue in three sections that Thus Spoke Zarathustra necessarily 
implies an aristocratic political system. In the section “Zarathustra’s Value Theory,” I 
first lay out Zarathustra’s account of the history of valuing, his problems with that 
history’s development, most importantly the rise of nihilism, and the theory he attempts 
to use to overcome nihilism, value creation. I then describe the two major problems with 
the theory: its incoherence and inability to overcome the eternal recurrence. In the second 
section, “Possible Interpretations of Value Creation,” I describe three different 
perspectives that can be used to understand Zarathustra’s value theory. By combining 
these perspectives, a coherent theory of value creation that overcomes nihilism and the 
eternal recurrence can be pieced together, though it only makes sense of value creation 
from an individual, internal level, not from a universal, external one. Using this theory of 
value creation and its adulation of the overman, in the third section, “Zarathustra and 
Politics” I provide a critique of modern liberalism and an alternative coherent with 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, aristocracy. Through my thesis I not only intend to demonstrate 
the weakness of the foundations of modern liberalism using Nietzsche’s philosophy, an 
easy task, but also to craft an argument based on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in my opinion 
Nietzsche’s most comprehensive work, that explains an alternative foundation for human 
values and a political system that reflects it.  
7 
Zarathustra’s Value Theory 
Value Creation and Nihilism 
 Zarathustra is most concerned with value creation. A story is sewn throughout 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra that describes how values evolved over time and why value 
creation is necessary. According to Zarathustra, “…only man placed values in things to 
preserve himself – he alone created a meaning for things.”1 Man sees the world through 
the lens of values, at first to determine what is good and bad for his survival. The 
meaning of values evolved along with society, and Zarathustra views the influence of 
institutions on the definition of “value” as a bad thing. He accuses the church and state of 
controlling the meaning of “good” and “evil,” indoctrinating the rabble in accordance 
with their low desires. Religion (Zarathustra is focused mostly on Christianity) teaches 
men that their suffering is justified because they will be rewarded in Heaven.
2
 The state is 
designed to keep the masses docile by feeding their petty desires; the state defines “good” 
and “evil” in such a way as to give their actions legitimacy.3 Zarathustra does not like 
these definitions of “good” and “evil” and asserts that “the greatest evil is necessary for 
the overman’s best.”4 In order to become Zarathustra’s ideal man, the value-creating 
overman, one must reject the values of the masses and embrace their evils, such as hard 
work and iconoclasm.  
 Zarathustra is especially worried about the problem of nihilism. God, according to 
Zarathustra, is killed by his love of man. He intends this to mean that man is so imperfect 
                                                             
1
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1995), 59. 
2
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 31. 
3
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 51. 
4
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 288. 
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according to his own morality that man ultimately came to prefer another form of 
valuing.
5
 God is replaced with the state, whose pandering to man’s lowest desires will, in 
Zarathustra’s terms, make the soil from which the overman should spring too infertile to 
support him. Men will soon “no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man,”6 
because their happiness will become reactionary; man will satiate his basic desires for 
food, water, and shelter, and aspire to little else. Zarathustra wants to avoid this nihilistic 
fate for man, where values are nothing more than sheer instinct and man is little more 
than a docile beast. Zarathustra’s companion and the embodiment of nihilism, his 
shadow, sums up the problem of nihilism effectively with the old adage, “Nothing is true, 
all is permitted;” Zarathustra’s nightmare of nihilism is realized in a world without truth 
or value.
7
 More than anything, Zarathustra wants man to have a reason to live, to value 
something, making nihilism man’s worst possible fate. 
 Zarathustra’s story of values is intended to show that values are created and, if 
there is a standard for what is good and bad, that standard does not belong to any value 
system believed in or proposed in the past. Each system has been a step along the 
tightrope that is man, according to Zarathustra:  “Man is a rope, tied between beast and 
overman. A rope over an abyss.”8 The beast is the man that naturally values out of self-
interest; man is capable of more complex values but is trapped in dogmatism and internal 
conflict. Zarathustra believes man is something that must be overcome. Otherwise, he 
will fall in the abyss and become the last man, a creature like a domesticated animal that 
                                                             
5
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 260. 
6
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 17. 
7
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 274. 
8
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 14. 
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cares only for basic comforts and is not even willing to fight to achieve its desires. 
Unfortunately for Zarathustra, his metaphor is played out in front of his eyes: when he 
first returns to civilization, he witnesses a tightrope walker’s death from a plunge off a 
tightrope because the aerialist is harassed by a jester, an event representing the value 
skepticism that leads to nihilism.
9
 Nietzsche uses this scene to first plant the idea in the 
reader that Zarathustra may not succeed in saving man from the abyss. 
 Zarathustra’s vision for the transcendence of man is the overman. The overman is 
a radical conception of individualism (for a select, capable few) that rejects all value 
systems of the past and creates a new, personal system of values. This individualism does 
not mean that the overman has to be greedy or only care about himself, but that he is only 
capable of holding internal values that he wills (barring possible external values 
Zarathustra professes). “Whoever must be a creator always annihilates,”10 Zarathustra 
says; to exercise one’s freedom to create, the individual must make something new and, 
in doing so, reject the old. Creation is done through one’s “will to truth,” the effort to 
craft a unique view of the world that is completely understandable to the creator.
11
 Thus 
the will to truth becomes the “will to power,” the overman’s will to creation and 
domination. Truth, then, takes on a meaning that makes it contingent to individuals. 
Zarathustra argues that because of man’s very nature as a creature that wills, his 
perception is irreparably clouded. He states, “This is what the will to truth should mean to 
you: that everything be changed into what is thinkable for man….And what you have 
                                                             
9
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 20. 
10
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 59. 
11
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 113. 
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called world, that shall be created only by you.”12 In other words, man can only 
“understand” the world from an individual perspective, and the world is created around 
that perspective. One’s standard of truth, then, is wrapped up in his values. 
 The root of value creation comes from unique individual experiences, which 
generate virtue. Zarathustra advises that one should keep his virtue secret from all others 
so that he may be sure his values are unique; otherwise, his values become subject to the 
interpretation and influence of the values of others.
13
 This catalyst of value highlights the 
limit of reason; a degree of valuing must rest on formative experiences but not enough to 
leave one prone to others’ belief systems. As Zarathustra puts it, one must have “faith in 
faith.”14 
 It is not enough just to create one’s own values. Zarathustra states that “…the man 
of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he must also be able to hate his friends.”15 
The overman is always pushing himself to dominate and overcome greater challenges, to 
test the strength of his values and make them stronger. For this reason, the overman 
should love that which challenges him, his enemies, and hate that which makes life 
easier, his friends. It is unclear, however, if Zarathustra is an overman or a prophet of 
overmen; his narrative describes his journey as an attempt to conquer many great 
challenges to his values, but it is unclear if he succeeds or not.  
 
 
                                                             
12
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 86. 
13
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 94. 
14
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 120. 
15
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 78. 
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Paradox and Incoherence 
 Zarathustra walks a fine line when he condemns all current forms of valuing 
while trying to establish a new form, value creation. It is unclear if he is able to overcome 
nihilism and save his value of noble (good) created values from his critique of other 
values. Zarathustra relishes the fact that common men hate “…the man who breaks their 
tablets of values, the breaker, the law breaker; yet he is the creator.”16 The problem is that 
Zarathustra is attempting to create a new set of tablets through his speeches, tablets that 
must be as “permanent” as Christianity and the state attempt to be, so he may be 
prescribing his own destruction. Value creation necessitates the rejection of old values; 
how can Zarathustra prevent his values from being rejected and his value creation from 
ultimately being overcome? Zarathustra’s gospel of value creation seems to be a paradox 
because it claims to be true but wills its own nullification.  
 It is also unclear how Zarathustra is able to make credible criticism of the rabble 
and praise of the overman if the truth of value statements encompasses no larger a sphere 
than individual experience. Zarathustra makes it clear, for instance, that he hates the last 
man. “Let me speak to them,” he says, “of what is most contemptible: but that is the last 
man.”17 The last man can only be contemptible if Zarathustra can make the argument that 
value creation is better than docile animalistic tranquility. If value and truth are relative to 
individuals because of nihilism, it will be difficult to make negative value judgments 
about the last man, the common man, religion, and the state that apply to all people (hold 
external validity). How can Zarathustra critique and advocate the destruction of other 
                                                             
16
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 23. 
17
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 17. 
12 
“false” value systems on the basis that nothing is externally valuable, and in turn argue 
for his own form of valuing? 
Eternal Recurrence 
 The theory of the eternal recurrence poses serious problems for Zarathustra’s 
values. This theory entails that “…we have existed an eternal number of times, and all 
things with us….we ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest as in what 
is smallest.”18 That is to say, history repeats itself and is deterministic in nature. Peter 
Berkowitz identifies the two areas of concern with Zarathustra’s values, when placed in 
the context of this theory, as “the burdens of the past and the laws of causal necessity.”19 
The “burdens of the past” implies two problems. The first is that if everything has already 
happened and is destined to happen again, unique creativity (in the sense that it is 
original) is impossible. The less controversial problem is that man is influenced by the 
past and it (the past) forms the basis of man’s beliefs and values, making it hard to 
overcome. The problem with causal necessity (or determinism) is that to be a free, 
creative individual, one must be in command of himself, not subject to the invisible 
equations of time and space. If the eternal recurrence exists, then, it seems to completely 
undermine Zarathustra’s theory of value creation. 
Zarathustra believes his greatest contribution to mankind is teaching them how to 
overcome the eternal recurrence and still value creatively. He says, “…to redeem what is 
past in man and to re-create all ’it was’ until the will says, ‘Thus I willed it! Thus I shall 
                                                             
18
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 220. 
19
 Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 208. 
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will it.’”20 Zarathustra believes potential overmen must take charge of the eternal 
recurrence and believe they will all of its implications: determinism, the past’s influence, 
and what they copy from the past. This seems to require willfully induced ignorance by 
the overman, however; it is illogical to think man can control the past. The eternal 
recurrence seems to strike a mortal blow to the ability to freely value create but will 
ultimately have little effect on the ends of the overman. The eternal recurrence has no 
direct implication on the ends of striving to fulfill difficult, unique values and unity of 
drives, or creating an honest illusion. Even if people cannot be in complete control of 
their will, utilizing one’s will to power to do great things is an active pursuit from the 
individual’s perspective, not passive or pre-determined like another’s analysis would 
dictate under the terms of the eternal recurrence.  
 
The solution to these problems posed to Zarathustra’s theory of value creation lies 
in cobbling together different possible interpretations of his philosophy. Though this 
solution may not provide a prescription for a set of external values that should govern all 
human life, it will provide a sounder basis for political life than the axioms and 
assumptions political life has been and currently is founded upon. 
                                                             
20
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 198. 
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Possible Interpretations of Value Creation 
Forms 
 One possible conception of Nietzschean values can be understood as similar to 
Platonic forms. Plato explains forms to be the essences of the objects and ideas that 
govern man’s existence, such as beauty and good.1 According to Plato’s Socrates, these 
essences have “the same simple, self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting 
variation at all.”2 Plato’s Socrates explains how to seek knowledge of the forms in The 
Republic. He says that knowledge is the “most vigorous of all powers,”3 and 
philosophers, as lovers of knowledge, should be kings.
4
 Using the light of the sun as a 
metaphor for knowledge,
5
 Socrates explains that in order to know what the form of the 
good is, philosophers must pursue knowledge.
6
 He also uses the famous cave metaphor to 
explain that the goal of his Republic utopia is for philosophers, the leaders of the 
Republic, to drag people from ignorance (the cave) into the light of the sun so that as 
many people as possible may also understand the form of the good.
7
 
 The burden of proof for forms is high. Forms are the ideal versions of all things 
that epitomize them, both concepts like truth, beauty, and the good, as well as objects, in 
the external world, that are valuable in themselves. Socrates is careful to distinguish 
between what is and what we see in a way that precludes variation in individual 
                                                             
1
 Plato, Phaedo, trans. by Benjamin Jowett (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 
accessed March 23, 2012, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedo.html. 
2
 Plato, Phaedo. 
3
 Allan Bloom, trans., The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1999), sec. 477 d. 
4
 Bloom, Republic, sec. 473 d. 
5
 Bloom, Republic, 188. 
6
 Bloom, Republic, sec. 517 b. 
7
 Bloom, Republic, sec. 516 a. 
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perception of forms, dismissing the latter as opinion.
8
 Understanding an absolute like the 
form of the good that exists externally seems impossible using reason alone for the very 
reasons Zarathustra is concerned with nihilism and tries to come up with a solution to it. 
Reason does not dictate value; humans emplace value upon the world. If things are 
valuable in themselves, even without the existence of man, people could not know it. The 
very process of human valuing precludes knowledge of external value, whether or not it 
exists. Nihilism, or humanity’s inability to discover any external values, precludes 
knowledge of the forms.  
 Nietzsche’s Zarathustra would denounce Platonic forms. As previously discussed, 
he believes truth is relative to the individual, and should be harnessed by those capable to 
create one’s own unique world and values.9 Zarathustra also explicitly expresses 
skepticism about immaculate perception, the goal of the theory of the forms. He likens 
men who try to be “pure perceivers” to the moon: they simply wish to look upon the earth 
in the dark, not shed the light of knowledge upon it like the sun.
10
 Because man 
necessarily must will, Zarathustra also views the task of “pure perception” as impossible. 
Concerning the so-called “pure perceivers,” he says, “Behind a god’s mask you hide from 
yourselves, in your ‘purity;’ your revolting worm has crawled into a god’s mask.”11 By 
not recognizing the existence of their own will, pure perceivers live a lie and, by willing 
to will nothing, they are at constant war with themselves. Zarathustra also worries that 
some of humanity’s most important perceptions, like love and beauty, would not exist if 
                                                             
8
 Bloom, Republic, 158. 
9
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 86. 
10
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 122. 
11
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 123. 
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men had immaculate perception. His companion later in the work, intended to be a 
devotee to pure perception, covers himself with leeches; in trying to drain away his will’s 
influence on his perception, he is slowly killing himself.
12
 Zarathustra’s opinions about 
Socrates’ aspirations to discover the one form of good for all mankind can be 
summarized in one short statement: “For the way – that does not exist.”13 
 The arguments may also make Zarathustra’s quest incoherent. His intention is to 
shatter the old tablets of the values of the state and religion and replace them with the 
overmen’s array of unique values which they created themselves. Zarathustra states, 
“…there are a thousand paths that have never yet been trodden – a thousand healths and 
hidden isles of life. Even now, man and man’s earth are unexhausted and 
undiscovered.”14 This seems incompatible with his earlier statement, “A thousand goals 
have there been so far….the one goal is lacking….if humanity still lacks a goal, is 
humanity itself not still lacking too?”15 The only way to reconcile these two statements is 
if Zarathustra’s true intention is to create a new master tablet, one that values the creation 
of values and governs and validates all new tablets generated by overmen. To put it into 
Platonic terms, the form of the good would be value creation. Zarathustra would then be a 
sort of philosopher king, pulling man out of the cave and into the sunlight of value 
creation a la The Republic. But if one turns Zarathustra’s own critique of valuing against 
him, it seems impossible for him to assert that his master tablet is a value that overcomes 
nihilism. Not only is Zarathustra’s ability to teach value creation in question (which will 
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 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 248. 
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 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 195. 
14
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 77. 
15
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 60. 
17 
be discussed later), but his theory requires the willful ignorance of the overman to his 
obedience to Zarathustra’s master tablet and the overman’s contentment with the mere 
individual ability to pass judgment on others’ values based on one’s own values. 
Zarathustra’s master value of value creation is unable to reach the height of a Platonic 
form.   
 It is possible that Zarathustra’s teachings are compatible with an individualized 
conception of forms. Zarathustra states that he longs to fulfill “…my most hidden will: a 
bow lusting for its arrow, an arrow lusting for its star…a sun itself and an inexorable 
solar will, ready to annihilate in victory.”16 His greatest wish is to destroy the tablets of 
old, like suns whose light induces the masses to view the world through their perspective 
on truth and values, and to generate overmen who cannot only destroy these suns, but 
who generate new ones to evade the abyss of darkness, nihilism. Zarathustra himself 
recognizes that he must be his own sun if he is to avoid this darkness when he states, 
“…many suns revolve in the void: to all that is dark they speak with their light – to me 
they are silent.”17 If one is to create a world that is completely thinkable for himself as an 
individual, with coherent theories of value and truth, these concepts would be forms to 
him within his world. It is possible the unity of drives theory may offer a better theory of 
value that can apply to all mankind than the Platonic form interpretation of Zarathustra’s 
teachings. 
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 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 215. 
17
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 105. 
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Unity of Drives 
It is possible to avoid the difficulties of external values through the “unity of 
drives” argument; this argument asserts that value is found through internal coherence. 
Alexander Nehamas provides a good overview of this position in his article, “How One 
Becomes What One Is.” Nehamas explains that Nietzsche is concerned with a unity of 
self: all things, and people, are the “sum of all its effects and features.”18 He further 
explains that man’s drives and desires are often at war with each other, so recognizing a 
single organism from a collection of these effects and features would be impossible 
without also factoring in the victor of the competition of drives, known by the choice the 
man ultimately makes. According to Nehamas, most people’s drives constantly fight 
amongst each other in an attempt to dominate all other desires and “…become the subject 
that, at least for a time, says ‘I.’”19 Zarathustra also expresses this sentiment. He worries 
that religion teaches men to despise their bodies and embrace death and suffering in order 
to enjoy utopia in the afterlife.
20
 This prevents men from realizing their creative 
capacities here on Earth; men must embrace their bodies, not the concept of the soul, and 
master it. The body, according to Zarathustra, is “one sense, a war and peace, a herd and 
a shepherd.”21 The body’s desires fight amongst themselves for power, and the self 
attempts to coherently organize the drives towards one goal, to shepherd these conflicting 
drives into an internally peaceful, but powerful, force.  
                                                             
18
 Alexander Nehamas, “How One Becomes What One Is,” The Philosophical Review 
XCII, No. 3 (July 1983): 398. 
19
 Nehamas, “One Is,” 400. 
20
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 35. 
21
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 34. 
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 In his discussion, Nehamas identifies the two key forces that lead to internal 
conflict: akrasia and self-deception.
22
 “Akrasia” is defined as acting against one’s better 
judgment, commonly practiced by men who choose what is easy over what they consider 
right. Men who deceive themselves tell themselves that they have internal coherence 
towards a certain value set, say, chastity, but lie to themselves and sublimate their desire 
for sex instead of successfully willing it away. Zarathustra’s disdain of “pure perceivers” 
is another prime example of self-deception. It follows then that a man’s major drive that 
motivates his creativity, whatever it may be, cannot just ignore other contradictory drives 
(self-deception), or ever submit to another desire (akrasia).
23
 The master drive must 
command, or otherwise obey; it must, as Zarathustra puts it, “…become the judge, the 
avenger, and the victim of its own law.”24 In order to do this, it must confront any desires 
that would render the unity of self, the “I,” incoherent, that would conquer it and bring it 
back into the flock. Zarathustra recognizes the best way to do this: “Whatever I create 
and however much I love it – soon I must oppose it and my love.”25 The will to power 
dictates that creators constantly challenge their master drive, so that it may overcome 
anything that challenges it, and constantly strengthen its creation.  
Because of this process of conquering higher and higher mountains (overcoming 
and assimilating more and more difficult desires/values), Nehamas continues, success and 
the end of unity become less important than this means to them. “One must still have 
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chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star,”26 Zarathustra says; if one 
actually achieves coherence, it is more likely one has given in to self-deception, or 
akrasia, than actually achieved a unity of drives. Still, “evil that grows out of the fight 
among your virtues;”27 unity of drives remains the ultimate goal, for war against oneself 
takes energy away from creation. Nehamas likens this process to literary creation: one 
designs himself as an aesthetic, unified character representing some major human drive, 
but also serves as that character’s author.28 To extol the great virtue he has chosen as his 
main drive, he must conquer great challenges, internal and external, using it. 
 It is unclear if the unity of drives theory can weather the many criticisms against 
it. The means/ends issue, that the goal of coherence may not be possible, is the first 
problem. The overman, a coherent individual, is a goal, but it is hard to conceptualize a 
creative actor who has co-opted not only all of man’s desires, but ideas contrary to his 
own, under his master desire. If creation is the ultimate good, perhaps this end is not 
desirable at all; if an overman finds a value so powerful that it unifies all other values, 
then truly meaningful creativity that shatters the old tablets would be impossible. It seems 
at times that Zarathustra flirts with the notion of value creation as a master tablet, but the 
incoherence of that notion poses a serious problem. The criteria for unity of drives also 
pose a problem. A normal man would have intense difficulty achieving unity of drive 
because his complexity of desires would lead to a great deal of akrasia and self-
deception. But the last man, a simple, docile, animalistic man, could hypothetically 
achieve a great deal of unity toward a master drive of simple contentment. Zarathustra’s 
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language makes it clear he has nothing but ire for the last man, but under the unity of 
drives theory, there is no way to make a value judgment against the last man. Zarathustra 
claims, “The higher its type, the more rarely a thing succeeds,”29 and the rarer, more 
difficult thing to achieve is the better thing. The lowest man, however, is internally 
coherent, and though he lacks complexity, a desire to create, and the will to higher things, 
his world makes perfect sense to him.  
 The political implications of the unity of drives theory are also unclear. One could 
interpret the theory to mean that the overman should strive to bring all aspects of his life 
under his command. This would mean not only submitting all of his lesser internal 
desires to his master drive, but bringing all people and the world under the fold of his 
values and perspective. This seems to be Zarathustra’s goal at times as he spreads the 
gospel of value creation, but, as previously discussed, the goal is incoherent. Individual 
coherence could be the sole goal, but this is also unsatisfactory. Zarathustra seems to 
suggest that those attempting to establish the greatness of their drive need to seek out and 
overcome contrary ideas. Unless Zarathustra thinks that man can reason through all 
contrary values to his own alone (which, evidenced by his trips down from his secluded 
mountain, he personally cannot), some interactions with other noble types is necessary. 
(The political conclusions of Zarathustra’s teachings will be discussed later.)  
 The Platonism and unity of drives theories both highlight the difficulty of 
coherently defending the external value judgments found in Zarathustra’s teachings. The 
mind independent virtues they support (coherence, unity, creation) do not necessarily 
entail the vision and values Zarathustra espouses. Having individual forms, values, and 
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master drives can be coherent, but they can only dictate moral absolutes to that particular 
individual. Zarathustra pines for something greater; he wants to be able to critique other 
common value sets (religion and the state) in a meaningful way greater than solipsism. 
His efforts to draw mankind towards the gospel of the overman highlight his aspiration to 
transcend his own mind, an effort that may be impossible by his own standard. Unity of 
drives does not necessitate creativity or difficulty but accommodates the overman. If one 
incorporates the unity of drives theory into the form of creativity as the good, it is 
possible to justify Nietzsche’s criticisms of religion and the common man as bad and low. 
This is because both are self-deceptive, susceptible to taking the easiest path, and at war 
internally as well as critical of the last man for not being a creative force. This 
unfortunately does not take us far enough: to satisfy Zarathustra, it is necessary to hold 
value and accept nihilism. In the absence of external absolutes, there seems to be little to 
keep man from plunging into the abyss of nihilism. Even if there was a form of the good 
or if the ultimate value was unity of drives, by Nietzsche’s own admission, overcoming 
nihilism seems to require at least a little faith. 
Honest Illusion 
 It is possible that there is an indirect way to overcome nihilism. On his travels, 
Zarathustra encounters a soothsayer who asserts, “All is the same, nothing is worthwhile, 
the world is without meaning, knowledge strangles.”30 Zarathustra invites this man, 
intended to represent nihilism, into his group of companions/disciples, who individually 
are flawed but who, together, represent the traits of the overman. The overman, therefore, 
must have some realization that any values he creates have no external relevance to the 
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valueless status of the world. The contradiction of the overman is apparent: how can one 
create an absolute value set for himself when absolute values do not exist? Nadeem 
Hussain’s “honest illusion” may be the only hope for a contingency in belief that will 
allow these two ideas, the overman and nihilism, to be compatible.  
 Hussein draws a connection between art, overcoming nihilism, and the creation of 
new values.
31
 Artists are capable of generating “honest illusions,” which Hussein 
describes as “a form of make-believe, pretending.”32 The talented artist is able to open a 
door to another reality, often his reality, and lure one into understanding his version of 
the truth with the power of his medium. Unlike other forms of self-deception that 
Zarathustra despises, art itself is something fake that reveals the truth. Shakespeare’s 
Macbeth, for instance, is not true, nor does it claim to be, but it does offer deep insight 
into possible negative consequences of ambition, arguably more effectively than any real-
life event. Though fake, it represents something true. When dealing with great works of 
art, man has the capability of understanding and feeling attachment to the values 
espoused by the work while realizing that the values are derived from a false reality. If 
this is possible, then it should also be possible to live like a character from a book, 
according to Nehamas, and author one’s own destiny. This is not enough for Zarathustra, 
however; he wants the assurance that the artist can truly overcome. He writes, “…poets 
lie too much,” and they are failures because they do not have deep enough thoughts, so 
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they write about the overman in a superficial way.
33
 Zarathustra does not want the value 
creator to not truly believe in what he says; this is the meaning behind Zarathustra’s 
companion, the magician, an actor.
34
 The magician is an ascetic and not one who truly 
values because the values he acts out are not honest illusions; instead, they are simple 
illusions that only fool others. Hussein’s theory strikes the proper balance between belief 
and illusion. The major difference between Hussein and Nehamas is that, according to 
Hussein’s theory, while the values that define one’s aesthetic pursuit are seductively 
convincing, the overman must also recognize and accept nihilism and the external 
meaninglessness of his beautiful, internal values; his values are contingent on the honest 
illusion that there is value. Zarathustra recognizes this ability, expressed as dancing and 
laughter, as the overman recognizing, embracing, and enjoying his contradictory nature.
35
 
 A close reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra reveals two more instances of 
opposing concepts that the overman is capable of holding simultaneously. The first is the 
incoherence of Zarathustra’s ultimate value of value creation. Zarathustra recognizes his 
theory’s possible incoherence when he states, “Now I bid you lose me and find 
yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you.”36 The only way 
to identify value creation as the ultimate good while creating a value set that thinks it is 
absolute is to forget the former and embrace the latter. One must forget Zarathustra’s 
teachings on value creation or destroy the concept of value creation if that person is to 
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design his own value. All the while, this person must recognize that he owes ultimate 
allegiance, not to his own theory of value, but to the ultimate good, value creation.  
 The second contradiction is the most important: reconciling the eternal recurrence 
with the overman. Zarathustra states in reference to the eternal recurrence that peak and 
abyss are joined together, and “It is out of the deepest depth that the highest must come to 
its height.”37 The eternal recurrence is the epitome of nihilism: though his will’s ability to 
choose makes it seem untrue, man can come to understand that he is bound to a past he 
does not control, helplessly traveling down the path of his destiny, not able to truly 
express his will to power, with creation and holding values seemingly impossible. 
Bernard Yack recognizes that “Willing the eternal return is the supreme will to power 
because it is the greatest contradiction that man has yet been asked to bear.”38 According 
to Yack, willing the eternal return “describes two different states of mind: the joyous 
affirmation of all life as if it had all the value that we ordinarily ascribe to permanence 
and the strength of will that constantly recognizes and suppresses knowledge of the 
world’s valuelessness.”39 The overman becomes, as far as mankind knows, a mythical 
creature: he embraces the truth of the eternal recurrence and nihilism but, at the same 
time, has just as powerful a belief in his values. He is even capable of willing the past in 
accordance with his own truth; Zarathustra states, “…to redeem those who lived in the 
past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it’ – that alone should I call 
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redemption.”40 To accomplish this monumental task of uniting the past, nihilism, and the 
eternal recurrence with one’s will to power, the overman must, in Zarathustra’s terms, 
unite the highest mountain and the abyss. 
 The honest illusion theory has allure, but it suffers from the basic contradiction it 
embraces. One cannot be a nihilist and believe in values. “Values = x” and “Values = {}” 
are not compatible. Saying that one holds value “x” contingent on the reality of nihilism 
also makes little sense; delusion and willful ignorance will not win a traditional 
philosophical debate. But perhaps if a man is able to invent his own world in which faith 
in the honest illusion can become truth, and if that will to truth can become his will to 
power, then the overman can have the power to live the contradiction of nihilism and 
value creation. Like a child at play, the overman is the author of his value and story; he 
fully believes in and plays his chosen role but is still able to laugh at himself and the 
world around him (because the internal values that govern his world are externally false), 
an attribute Zarathustra describes as a “prankish” spirit.41 This kind of drastic measure is 
necessary if nihilism is to be overcome. 
 
 All of these theories have serious problems and are not able to overcome nihilism 
on logic alone. It is possible that Nietzsche wanted to use Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a 
manual to describe the problems of modernity and the extreme difficulty they posed. 
Zarathustra himself seems to be a failure. Zarathustra leaves the solitude of his cave to 
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“go under” because he loves man.42 This is to say, Zarathustra’s weakness is his love of 
man, and going under, meaning returning to civilization and all of its problems, is a 
mistake he makes. It certainly is not clear that Zarathustra should be trying to teach 
mankind the doctrine of the overman at all; most of his teachings are rejected, except that 
of the last man, which people embrace. Zarathustra is at least a failure in his corruption; 
he converts and guides no real, possible overmen from his interaction with the masses nor 
from his sacrifice of his internal serenity for external goals like saving mankind from 
nihilism. Towards the end of his documented travels, Zarathustra discovers that many of 
his original companions have turned to religious faith.
43
 In Part IV of the book, he finds 
new, unsatisfactory companions. Though each possesses a different quality of the 
overman, collectively they still are foolish; they worship an ass because they can only 
hold values ironically.
44
 Ultimately, one finds that Zarathustra’s weakness of loving man 
changes the tone of his language from praising solitude, individualistic value creation, 
and the hardship required to do so, to striving, not for the happiness of overcoming but 
for the joy and distraction of companionship and for the possibility of teaching something 
to his new, eccentric entourage, no matter how shallow or meaningless that teaching 
might be.  
 All of this drives home the most important issue when considering Nietzsche’s 
political philosophy. Modernity has revealed the many contradictions with which man 
lives, opposing forces so crippling they possibly undermine the coherence of any external 
value theory, leaving man to the abyss of nihilism. The proper response to this issue is to 
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focus on internal truth for one’s own salvation from nihilism, not undertake the 
Herculean task of attempting to save others from the abyss (which appears to be an 
impossible task in Thus Spoke Zarathustra). If mankind cannot have a coherent external 
theory of value, then man needs to learn to overcome the contradictions of modern 
existence and make the faith required to do so his truth. It is unclear whether Nietzsche 
would agree completely with the forms, unity of drives, or honest illusion conceptions of 
his theory, but together a coherent internal theory of value can be crafted. Creative forms 
based on individual virtue challenge the overman to foster his own unique values, the 
goal of unity motivates the overman to continue to challenge himself to make his world 
reflect his values, and the overman must be capable of honest illusion in order to perceive 
his internal values with external validity despite nihilism and the eternal recurrence. Few 
men are capable of this lofty self-mastery, and it is clear Nietzsche and Zarathustra do not 
want men capable of this to be dragged down by the common man’s desires and politics. 
With its foundations in the individual values of a select few, Nietzsche’s political ideal 
will serve as a stark contrast to any modern society founded on unjustified assumptions 
and axioms of external value. 
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Zarathustra and Politics 
Democracy and the Common Man 
 The political system that follows from Zarathustra’s value theory is bound to be 
complex because he is never explicit about the government that would be most conducive 
to the overman. There is, however, one political point in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that is 
perfectly clear: democracy is bad. Any form of government that empowers “the rabble,” 
the common man who is easily persuaded and indoctrinated by weak values or the values 
of others, is a bad government that could stifle the overman. Zarathustra finds it is 
impossible to communicate with most people because his teachings reject the common 
herd-morality of the time.
1
 He also finds that his perspective, derived from long periods 
of isolated contemplation, prevents him from effectively communicating with those so 
different from himself.
2
 Any form of reason is most likely lost on the masses as well; 
Zarathustra observes, “What the mob learned to believe without reasons – who could 
overthrow that with reasons?”3 Ethos and pathos, as he sees it, are the means of coercing 
the masses to one’s will; reasoned values will not triumph over what the masses want to 
hear. The mob believes that “there are no higher men, we are all equal, man is man; 
before God we are all equal.”4 These last men are only concerned with reducing their 
suffering and preserving themselves for the longest period of time comfortably, to no 
difficult or beautiful end.
5
 According to Zarathustra, the masses reject the overman 
because his value creation and strength destroy their otherwise blissful contentment and 
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ignorance of their own weakness.
6
 The false egalitarian principles of the rabble and their 
desire to enforce it on those that strive to higher ends makes democracy, the government 
that lends the most power to the masses, dangerous indeed. Men of the egalitarian fold 
only wish to drag under, not raise up; Zarathustra writes that their “…most secret 
ambitions to be tyrants thus shroud themselves in words of virtue.”7 All men desire 
power, and the weaker wish to punish the powerful and become the new masters.
8
 
Zarathustra further purports that the desire of all men to be the best, whether it be 
individually greatest, or equal, best, and worst among all men, is brought about by man’s 
Hobbesian realization that he must have as much power as possible if he is to be capable 
of trumpeting his will above all other men’s wills.9 Everyone, according to Zarathustra, 
desires to be the master. 
 Zarathustra continues his commentary on overmen by arguing that they do not 
lead democracies because the herd is incapable of understanding their greatness. Further, 
the overman does not desire the praise or scorn of the common man, for his opinion 
means nothing; the masses are but flies, swarming the smelliest, largest pile of dung they 
can find.
10
 In Zarathustra’s eyes, the men who lead democracies are actors and sophists, 
capable of feeding the masses exactly what they want to hear. The marketplace of ideas is 
nothing more than a place for men who want power to make the loudest noise to get the 
most attention.
11
 The potential leaders in the marketplace frame the truth and value as 
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“yes” or “no” answers, simple external absolutes, something any man striving to 
overcome nihilism would know is silly.
12
 Zarathustra states, “I turned my back on those 
who rule when I saw what they now call ruling: haggling and haggling for power – with 
the rabble.”13 Great men, in his view, should not lower themselves to representing the 
herd’s will; this is no true shepherd’s task. 
Modern Liberalism 
 Modern justifications of liberalism argued by men such as John Rawls and 
Richard Rorty fail to meet Zarathustra’s standards. John Rawls argues in A Theory of 
Justice that because there is no agreement on value theory, liberalism balances people’s 
interests as free actors as a part of a larger community. Rawls’ conception of justice as 
fairness goes against everything Zarathustra stands for.  His basis for the definition of 
fairness in society is founded in the “original position”14 thought experiment that if, under 
a veil of ignorance in which people did not know their future and they were forced to 
decide what was fair based on self-interest, all people would choose the maxi-min 
principle.
15
 This principle dictates that it is rational to be risk adverse in order to 
guarantee access to primary goods (food, water, shelter). Further, people would prefer to 
live in a society in which they had as many primary goods as they needed instead of one 
in which they had a small chance of being very powerful and a large chance of being 
poor and starving.
16
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The original position establishes the definition of “justice” as fairness, according 
to Rawls. This “fairness,” he explains, is meant as the amount of liberty one can be 
afforded in a situation where all people are regarded as equals.
17
 From this definition, two 
principles of justice are derived. The first is that each person has the right to as much 
liberty as is consistent with the liberty of others. In other words, no one can have less 
liberty than anyone else.  The second principle is that social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they can be reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage 
and attached to positions and offices available to all.
18
 This can also be called the 
Difference Principle: inequalities of primary goods are only allowed insofar as they 
benefit the worst-off. From these principles one can make the following determination: 
Rawls thinks that because people are risk adverse, in the original position they would 
rather guarantee that they had access to the primary goods they needed than allow for the 
possibility of using natural or social endowments to procure goods for themselves alone. 
These two principles are the basis of Rawls’ just egalitarian liberal democracy. 
Rawls’ egalitarian liberal democracy provides no distinction between the great 
and the mediocre nor between the great man and the common man that Zarathustra 
demands; everyone who follows a rational life plan is equal in value. According to 
Rawls, men of high quality deserve just as much liberty as the man who, in his ignorance, 
lacks the freedom to think about difficult concepts and art because of his lazy and weak 
faculties. These shortcomings limit the excellent man’s freedom, which he must use to 
benefit the worst men who, in their inability to understand great things, limit the excellent 
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man to furnishing them (the worst men) with self-respect, food, and money. While 
“excellence” and “greatness” are difficult words for Zarathustra to define outside of the 
overman’s pursuit of his own values, it is apparent that Rawls’ lack of any explicit end 
man should pursue leads to an unsatisfactory conclusion. This exclusion is meant to 
suggest that all men, genius or foolish, should posses equal rights to attain their goals as 
long as they obey Rawls’ principles of justice. Because no goal is better than another 
(within Rawls’ constraints), society should provide all men with “equal” opportunity to 
achieve their ends, rather than aiding, or getting rid of constraints, on those who are more 
excellent than the common man. 
 Rawls’ ideal political system actually appears to be Zarathustra’s dystopia. 
Zarathustra’s last man desires a safe, complacent life fulfilling his basic desires. Rawls’ 
devotion to equality and fairness does not lead man to his peak, to strive to overcome 
great challenges in creating his own values. Instead, great men are forced to service the 
paltry desires of the masses if they obey Rawls’ principles of justice, or wreak havoc on 
his society with little consequence otherwise. If an uncommonly skilled man’s pursuits 
are too abstract for the general populace to understand or benefit from, according to 
Rawls’ principles of justice, the man must find a different pursuit that exercises his skills 
in such a way that they benefit the worst-off. While it is a great task indeed to provide 
nourishment for the indigent, it is unacceptable that all men must tackle the Herculean 
task of providing all people with primary goods, including those whose greatest skill lies 
in areas other than fields related to primary goods like agricultural science and 
economics. Even Rawls’ assumption inherent to the maxi-min theory is offensive to 
excellence and the human condition; rather than take great risks and strive for greatness, 
34 
Rawls thinks men will be content with little more than primary goods, like animals. His 
Theory of Justice does not create a society that rewards and promotes greatness; instead, 
it provides the masses, now Nietzsche’s last man, with basic comfort and subsistence in 
his apathetic existence. Allan Bloom frames the situation well in his paper, “John Rawls 
Vs. the Tradition of Political Philosophy,” when he writes, “The community desired is 
one…without great sacrifices or great risks, one made for men’s idle wishes and for the 
sake of which man has been remade…,[the society] supports our easygoing self-
satisfaction….Nietzsche might provide a more appropriate title for this book: A First 
Philosophy for the Last Man.”19 Indeed, Bloom recognizes that Rawls’ idealistic and 
impractical egalitarian liberal democracy narrows the scope of man’s liberty, debases him 
via the relativity of the good, and limits him to the lowly pursuit of primary goods to 
provide simple happiness if he chooses to abide by Rawls’ doctrine of justice. 
 Richard Rorty is a liberal who embraces Zarathustra’s teachings by turning the 
“honest illusion” conception of his value theory on its head. In his book, Contingency, 
irony, and solidarity, Rorty accepts the individually relative nature of truth and argues 
that men attempt to convert each other to their conceptions of truth and value 
perspectives through language.
20
 He believes the world itself cannot be true or false; 
instead, man judges its validity through language descriptions. Language also is neither 
true nor false, but rather is contingent on the values of the particular era in which it is 
found. Rorty talks about the progression of language through history in the context of the 
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Enlightenment. He believes that the liberal culture he advocates “needs an improved self-
description rather than a set of foundations” because foundations are a product of the 
Enlightenment perspective that ends must have nonhuman authority, preferably science 
to religion.
21
The language of the Enlightenment, he contends, is no longer valuable in this 
era of Nietzschean relativism, because terms like “objective” and “foundation” have lost 
much of their Enlightenment-era meaning. Even the results of science, viewed by many 
Enlightenment-era thinkers as truth, have, in the postmodern era, been corralled with all 
other human endeavors in the category of “value.” Thus, Rorty believes that because the 
relativists are currently winning the language game, liberal culture’s justification requires 
the standard for this era, an appealing description, rather than the standard for the 
Enlightenment era, objective foundations. It is from this basis of changes in language, 
Rorty argues, that the track of human history winds and turns. Further, advocates of 
various ideologies must play the language game and attempt to either promote their views 
using the language of the time, or design and implement a new vocabulary to create a 
new era favorable to their viewpoint if they wish to successfully proliferate their ideals. 
 It is in this context that Rorty suggests his utopia of liberal ironists. He defines an 
“ironist” as “the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her most central 
beliefs and desires,” and a “liberal” as one who finds cruelty abhorrent.22 The ironist has 
no reason to be liberal and no reason not to hurt others beyond what his individual 
feelings and opinions dictate; fascism, for instance, would be acceptable in a relativistic 
world. If it is possible for such an individual as the liberal ironist to exist, Rorty would 
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populate his utopia with them. He believes that in this post-metaphysical society people 
will live in tolerance of each other because they do not desire to oppress others nor force 
their views on them. They neither hunger for dominance over others nor want to 
proliferate some absolute belief because of their kind and relativistic beliefs. Thus, the 
presence of sympathy and lack of extremism would breed solidarity into society and 
would allow the most possible languages to be realized due to stability and tolerance. 
This belief would be the foundation of Rorty’s utopia: a world that proliferates freedom 
constrained only by a lack of human suffering and in which the only universal principle is 
the contingency of all values. 
 Zarathustra would reject Rorty’s liberal utopia just as he would reject Rawls’. 
Rorty’s position that value justification is descriptive would be akin to Zarathustra’s 
beliefs that individual values are rooted in the virtue found through personal struggle. 
Rorty’s conception of irony as the interaction between values and nihilism is similar to 
the contradiction Zarathustra embraces, to some degree, as discussed in the honest 
illusion conception of Zarathustra’s value theory. Zarathustra would have no reason to 
rule out cruelty, for it is this exact aversion to suffering and causing pain that leads to the 
docile last man. If Rorty’s utopia, in which there would still be great philosophical and 
aesthetic expression, is to be achieved, struggle and competition, possibly violent, could 
not be ruled out. Zarathustra affords no respect for the rights of all mankind except 
through his enemies who challenge him to transcend to new heights. The docile 
acceptance of relativism and the moderating effect it has on one’s values also diverges 
from the honest illusion conception of Zarathustra’s value theory. Zarathustra would want 
men to fight for their values as if they were 100% true while accepting the contradictory 
37 
theory of nihilism to also be true; Rorty, on the other hand, simply tries to find pragmatic, 
peaceful reconciliation between these two theories. Because Rorty rules out some means 
to express one’s will to power, espouses an acceptance of docile pacifism, and allows for 
a diluted belief in one’s own values, Zarathustra would criticize Rorty’s philosophy as 
little better than Rawls.  
Political Skepticism 
Zarathustra’s critique of politics cannot be limited to democracy. Any government 
founded on some conception of a social contract (understood to be an agreement between 
the government and the people in which the people give up some autonomy for the 
protection of at least their life and limb) is vulnerable to Zarathustra’s skepticism about 
government. In his view, paying heed to the masses’ desires in any way is a form of 
corruption. Educating the entirety of the population, not just those capable of deep 
understanding, is undesirable because it drags down the status of art and literature. He 
further argues that writers do not only transcribe the values of the rabble of their time into 
their stories, but they dumb-down their work to appeal to a broader literate audience.
23
 
This is also true of the state: it deceives to get what it wants and dilutes deep concepts 
that it steals from individual creators and dresses them up to gain broad appeal.
24
 The 
state replaces religion for Zarathustra as the “new idol” that the herd worships; 
nationalism becomes the battle cry of the era without God – good is sacrifice for the state 
and evil is working against its authority. The leaders of the modern state sit upon thrones 
of mud; their power is not derived from their will to power but from public approval, 
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deceit, and a lack of personal integrity.
25
 Powerful ideas cease to be valuable; material 
wealth as a means to power becomes the state’s all-consuming goal to keep its people 
content and submissive. On this subject Zarathustra states, “Only where the state ends, 
there begins the human being who is not superfluous: there begins the song of necessity, 
the unique and inimitable tune.”26 Freedom to create values is derived from the 
destruction of the state and its value tablets, glorifying the petty appetites of the masses. 
Finding a government structure that does not have to pander to the common man’s needs 
poses a difficult goal. 
 Tamsin Shaw frames Zarathustra’s problems with politics well in her book, 
Nietzsche’s Political Skepticism. Shaw writes that, in the case that Nietzsche does believe 
in external value, “…the demands of normative authority and political authority cannot 
be reconciled.”27 This is to say that Zarathustra’s absolute good, whether it is the 
aesthetics, unity, and/or freedom linked to value creation, will always be constrained by 
traditional political entities. The stance that values cannot be mind-independent (moral 
anti-realism) faces a similar problem, Shaw argues: “For the antirealist cannot coherently 
recommend that others arrive at value judgments independently and at the same time 
recommend the imposition of political values that would require ideological 
subordination.”28 In other words, individual value creation would be stifled by the state’s 
desire to impose its own values, which is necessary to preserve itself. Both of these 
                                                             
25
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 50. 
26
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 51. 
27
 Tamsin Shaw, Nietzsche’s Political Skepticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 
112. 
28
 Shaw, Skepticism, 108. 
39 
outlooks share the same basic problem when it comes to government: political systems 
are by nature coercive and attempt to limit value creation with social conditioning and 
brute force. All government types constrain value creation in some way: political regimes 
of the people, democracy and communism, require obedience to the people; theocracy, to 
a specific religion; and fascism, totalitarianism, and monarchy, to a specific man or state 
ideology. Anarchy seems like an unlikely option if for no other reason than Nietzsche 
implicitly accepts the natural existence of government through his observation that the 
common men stick together like a herd under a shepherd-sophist whose crook is his 
values. Zarathustra accepts that the state must exist as a crutch for the weak, but any sort 
of authority that the state attempts to impress over individual normative authority of 
potential overmen is problematic. There are two possible solutions to this conflict 
between the overman and state authority: the overman can live like a hermit in the 
mountains, completely absorbed in his own world, or he can rule nations, make them bow 
to his values and will, and attempt to submit others to his vision of the world as a form of 
overcoming other’s ideologies and power.  
 
Individual vs. Community 
 Nietzsche’s account of Zarathustra’s travels makes it unclear whether the 
overman should be a hermit or a conqueror. Whenever Zarathustra leaves his mountain, 
Nietzsche implies that he taints himself: Zarathustra must “go down” and “go under to 
the masses” because he loves them too much.29 Zarathustra is compelled, however to 
spread his message; this need/desire may be part of the nature of the overman or 
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Zarathustra’s greatest flaw. He exclaims, “…you great star, what would your happiness 
be had you not those for whom you shine?....Behold I am weary of wisdom, like a bee 
that has gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to receive it.”30 Zarathustra 
needs an outlet to share his knowledge, his perspective, and his message of value 
creation. His value set is a little worthless, after all, if he keeps it to himself. It would be a 
lowly struggle for Zarathustra to create the value of value creation, and then not inspire 
other men to create value.  
 Zarathustra quickly comes to the conclusion, after witnessing the common 
townsfolks’ positive response to his description of the last man, that he needs to find 
companions, not convert the masses.
31
 It is possible that most men lack the mental 
capacity to comprehend Zarathustra’s teachings, but it is also possible Zarathustra is a 
terrible teacher; few men in their right mind would trust a prophet bellowing in the 
middle of town. Zarathustra also fails to find companions. He observes, “Companions the 
creator once sought, and children of his hope; and behold, it turned out that he could not 
find them, unless he first created them himself.”32 As observed earlier, Zarathustra’s 
original disciples turn to religion or turn to faith because holding an absolute belief one 
creates is very difficult. Zarathustra, unable to create companions, indeed finds 
unsatisfactory ones who distract him from his goal of creating the overman. In losing his 
pity for the higher man, Zarathustra abandons preaching the doctrine of the overman and 
value creation, content with his foolish companions at his mountain retreat.
33
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 Zarathustra makes it clear that any traditional close friendships or meaningful 
connections are out of the question for the overman. Zarathustra writes, “In a friend one 
should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him with your heart when you 
resist him.”34 The person the overman respects most is his rival, who does not make his 
road easier or, worst of all, who pities him in times of weakness instead of challenging 
him to be strong. A great rival is a great obstacle to overcome and a true test of the 
overman’s will to power. The overman would have to dumb himself down to connect 
with the masses, and companions provide unnecessary aid. Only Zarathustra requires 
companions, for if he is to be successful in espousing the tablets of value creation, he 
must generate the overmen to generate the new values he glorifies. The extreme 
individualism in Zarathustra is found throughout the book. Instead of debating sophists in 
the marketplace, making loud noises to please the crowds, Zarathustra recommends, 
“Flee, my friend, into your solitude!”35 He observes that “In the end, one experiences 
only oneself;” it is impossible to ever understand the perspective of another individual or 
completely convert them to one’s will.36 This is completely fine with Zarathustra, who is 
adamant that one should keep the virtue that is the root of one’s value creation secret at 
all costs.
37
 All of this describes a solipsistic conception of politics, that one should remain 
confined to one’s own mind in pursuit of becoming the overman and creating values.  
 This does not mean that the overman can have a superficial relation to the state. 
Like a philosopher king, the overman must rule over his domain since he is highest; the 
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life of a mountain recluse provides one few opponents to overcome and little to master 
besides the philosophical ideas one generates. Zarathustra observes a hierarchy in society 
that, though it is unclear whether he can claim mastery is better than slavery in the face of 
nihilism, holds basic truths that would resound with most men. He claims one should 
“…will nothing beyond your capacity;” there is an order to the ability to will, and 
attempting to cross one’s threshold will lead to a life of self-deception and 
disappointment.
38
 Zarathustra expands on this concept when he observes that most men 
are not capable of being the overman, and they throw away their last value when they 
throw away their servitude.
39
 He holds that there are natural roles men have in the pursuit 
of individual values and how they relate to each other; the slavish should serve the more 
gifted noble types capable of value creation, not give obedience to others’ values. 
Zarathustra believes that there is a hierarchy among men, and it follows that 
man’s politics should reflect their varied capacities. Though all men desire to rule, the 
best should lead, and the weak should follow. Zarathustra states, “He who cannot obey 
himself is commanded. That is the nature of the living.”40 The people of the rabble obey 
the value of others. Sophists, priests, and statesmen believe in nothing and will say 
anything to gain power, and can only obey their will to the extent that the masses 
empower them; their will is determined by what the rabble values and desires. The only 
people left who truly command themselves, Zarathustra argues, are the overmen. This 
statement is crucial to understanding the political philosophy that flows from 
Zarathustra’s teachings and journey. Man should be in a political hierarchy, according to 
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Zarathustra, in which the strong should serve the weak and the smaller should yield to the 
greater.
41
 Those that obey the overman can never truly have his values, for his values are 
trapped within his mind, but they can still follow him based on whatever lowly set of 
values they are able to glean from their subordination to his will. Still, Zarathustra 
observes, “Commanding is harder than obeying; and not only because he who commands 
must carry the burden of all who obey.”42 The overman, Zarathustra is saying, must not 
only be responsible for his domain, but for himself. His kingdom is only governed by his 
values, without friends or companions, and his followers’ importance ranges from 
incidental to pawns in conflict with other overmen. The will of the overman is like the 
master drive of the unity of desires theory: it regulates itself and the subordinate desires 
that serve it. Zarathustra continues that the necessity of politics is a consequence of the 
existence of common men who need noble men to provide them with values. One comes 
to understand the overman as a creature capable of believing in his own values like forms 
of the good, striving to unite his world, the people that reside in it and in his own mind, 
under his theory of values, while effectively grappling with and overcoming antithetical 
ideas to his will to power, nihilism, and the eternal recurrence. In becoming the overman, 
Zarathustra says, “he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.”43 He 
strives to overcome any institution that wishes to subordinate his will, whether it is other 
individuals, religion, or the state, with his own kingdom. 
Aristocracy 
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Zarathustra’s ideal world political order would be a number of aristocratic nations 
in a constant state of war. All-out war, utilizing all resources, not just the overman’s mind 
but also his surroundings, is necessary if a struggle among noble types is truly an all-out 
test of each other’s wills to power. Zarathustra recognizes that there are many paths to the 
future, and life overcomes itself again and again through the constant war of values in 
eternal recurrence.
44
 He proclaims, “The godlike strivers – with such assurance and 
beauty, let us be enemies too, my friends! Let us strive against one another like gods.”45 
A noble, in Zarathustra’s eyes, should only “love peace as a means to new wars – and the 
short peace more than the long.”46 He should never fight for peace to appease the 
common man’s docility, but should fight for victory, to conquer other’s wills and bring 
them under his own. A state of true peace would be tragic for the overman, because it 
would mean only he possessed the will to fight and the weapons to conquer, and there 
would be no more great mountains to conquer.
47
 It is important to recognize that 
Zarathustra thinks wars of ideas and values are far more potent than the flair and glamour 
of battlefield combat. Zarathustra states that “The greatest events – they are not our 
loudest but our stillest hours. Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the 
inventors of new values does the world revolve.”48 Physical war is an option that should 
never be precluded by the overman in the pursuit of great feats, but it is not of the same 
caliber of worth as intellectual combat. Zarathustra further proclaims, “War and courage 
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have accomplished more great things than love of the neighbor.”49 To him, it is not love 
of others but love of one’s own values and the great suffering and struggle involved with 
realizing those values and their implied truths upon the world that leads to man’s greatest 
political and aesthetic triumphs. 
Understanding the nature of the nobles fighting Zarathustra’s perpetual war of 
value is the key to understanding the overman. The noble man wants to create something 
new from his virtue and does not live for brief pleasures, Zarathustra explains.
50
 The 
noble man does not define himself by his father’s or man’s past achievements, like 
Zarathustra’s two king companions, but creates his own success.51 Zarathustra continues 
that nobles never resist their master drive; recalcitrance is the “nobility of slaves,” he 
says.
52
 Nobles must submit to their chosen value set and loyally fight for it. Nobles 
recognize that “Men are not equal. Nor shall they become equal!”53 There can be no 
nobles, no overman, no higher and lower, in the truly egalitarian world. The noble has a 
lust to rule and, with his strong virtues, he crushes uncertain ones.
54
 To rule, one must 
descend, like Zarathustra, from the mountain to the valley of man, and though this lowers 
the noble, his greatest triumph may be bringing the men of the valley onto his mountain. 
This is what Zarathustra labels the “gift-giving virtue” any great leader must have: the 
ability to bestow value on lesser men and to deliver them from nihilism.
55
 The noble still 
does this for selfish reasons, however. Zarathustra proclaims the virtue of “…the 
                                                             
49
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 47. 
50
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 44. 
51
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 247. 
52
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 48. 
53
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 101. 
54
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 189. 
55
 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 190. 
46 
wholesome, healthy selfishness that wells from a powerful soul – from a powerful soul to 
which the high body, beautiful, triumphant, refreshing, around which everything become 
a mirror.”56 The noble’s world must reflect his excellence, his high truth, his ambitious 
values, and can only do so if he raises it up to his level.  
Through this description of the noble, one comes to know the overman’s ultimate 
end. Zarathustra claims that “Human society is a trial: thus I teach it, and what it tries to 
find is the commander.”57 He also contends that “The best should rule, and the best also 
want to rule.”58 The overman is, in fact, not a creation locked within his own psychology, 
waging an internal war of philosophy, but must be understood as a political animal. There 
is an external world, a seemingly meaningless one, for which the overman must not only 
find values to interpret it from within, but for which he must also use his will to power to 
bring this world to kneel before his values. Because of this, Zarathustra states, “A new 
nobility is needed to be the adversary of all rabble and all that is despotic and to write 
anew upon new tablets the word ‘noble.’”59 Tyrants try to destroy and discard the past for 
their own benefit and the rabble do not care to remember the past. Nobles, however, as 
potential overmen capable of embracing the contradiction of the eternal recurrence, also 
embrace the past, and in turn strive to not just will the past and the present but also their 
future, both their individual fate and the fate of their world. Complete victory should 
never be achieved, however, for the sake of value creation. Zarathustra says, “For many 
who are noble are needed, and noble men of many kinds, that there may be a nobility. Or 
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as I once said in a parable: ‘precisely this is godlike that there are gods, but no God.’”60 
The noble fights for victory but is defined by his struggle to that end; the overman could 
not exist if he achieved victory, for then there would only be one set of values, and, like 
nihilism, this would crush man’s individual will and the creativity that makes him great. 
Bernard Yack sums up Zarathustra’s view of political life best when he writes, “Through 
the imposition of physical suffering and discipline, the great politics of ideological war 
will restore the taste and self-discipline that modern individuals have lost.”61 Great 
struggle and great suffering are the salvation of mankind, for they force mankind to 
abandon the complacency of the last man and the spiritual abyss of nihilism to rise to 
something higher in order to survive: a belief in something worth fighting for. 
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Conclusion 
 The Nietzschean world is one of great individuals waging ideological conflict 
with Zarathustra as its doomed prophet.  For Zarathustra to succeed he must be rejected; 
the overman believes not in value creation but in his own created values. The overman 
heeds Zarathustra’s words: to be great his will to power must pursue his values as if they 
were the form of the good, embrace the condition that contradiction between his values 
and nihilism is only overcome by his will’s ability to embrace contradiction itself, and 
unify himself towards the faith he has in his own truth and the master drive it dictates he 
should have. While understanding that the internal dynamics of the overman is important, 
however, it is also impossible to understand him without factoring in the external, the 
political. One has not conquered oneself until he conquers the world he perceives. If the 
world does not reflect the overman’s truth and values, it is his job as the best man to 
make it so. The overman, supreme over his domain, is not the best through others’ 
recognition, but because he has unified the world, along with his mind, toward one end – 
his own. It does not matter if the common men ruled by an overman understand his vision 
and the values that drive him, because he does not derive authority from them; all that 
matters is that their actions serve that overman’s value system and do not work against it. 
In this way, the internal absorbs the external; political life is an extension and reflection 
of warring overmen’s values and wills.  
Nietzsche does not desire a utopia of one overman with all of life’s questions 
answered. The overman is defined by his struggle, his perpetual self-overcoming through 
the eternal recurrence. He lives for struggle against fellow overmen so that he may prove 
his greatness in overcoming other great enemies. An overman who has conquered all has 
49 
no other way to prove his greatness. This is Zarathustra’s folly: he wishes to make a new 
tablet, an unbreakable tablet, to rule all overmen. Though his teaching may be the rope 
that spans the abyss of nihilism so that worthy men may become the overmen, the 
message of value creation has no external standard for judging other’s values, nor is it 
able to defend its own worth. Zarathustra’s desire to found the master drive of master 
drives, to transcend the war of values with his all encompassing philosophy, is a futile 
task indeed. This is why Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a book for all and yet for none: not 
only is Nietzsche skeptical that the overman can exist, he also believes that no one should 
imitate Zarathustra’s own struggle but that all should learn from his mistakes. Through 
Zarathustra’s journey in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche delivers a powerful critique 
of modern society, a path to the future, and exposes the folly of a man trying to be the 
conqueror of the overmen on the battlefield of contingent values over the precipice of 
nihilism. Only through simultaneously struggling against and embracing the internal and 
political value conflicts embodied by the eternal recurrence can man find salvation from 
nihilism and the complacency of the egalitarian liberalism that embraces it. The only 
form of politics that allows for this all-out noble struggle is aristocracy. 
50 
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